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FOREWORD 
The Atlantic Alliance is at the center of America's concerns, for it 
is on what happens in the Atlantic community that the world's pros-
pects for peace with freedom chiefly depend. Our interest in Europe 
Is not reduced because of our effort in Vietnam. The strength and 
mutual confidence of the Atlantic allies are the single most important 
guarantee that the processes of peaceful change will not break down. 
The member states of the Atlantic Alliance may take justified 
pride in the steadiness of their policies since World War II. We had 
the will to turn weakness into strength, and we have. We had the 
will to be both firm and restrained in the tests to which we have been 
subjected. The combination has been the foundation of peace in 
the Western world and the ground for our hopes that a genuine 
European settlement will one day be attained. 
The circumstances of 1967 are not the circumstances of 1949. As 
times change, the Alliance will undergo many changes. It must if 
it is to ~erve the purposes and interests of the members. But the 
all-important question remains the same: to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, will the Atlantic allies stay the course? 
With this question in mind our subcommittee initiated a Senate 
study of the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout, the inquiry has been 
conducted on a professional and nonpartisan basis. The subcom-
mittee has published detailed testimony from Dean Acheson, the 
late Christian A. Herter, Lauris Norstad, Richard E. Neustadt, 
Thomas C. Schelling, Malcolm W. Hoag, John J. McCloy, Dean 
Rusk and Robert S. McNamara. It has sought the counsel of a 
number of past and present officials and students of alliance operations 
in this country and in Europe. 
Drawing on this testimony and counsel, this staff report makes 
certain findings on the tasks of deterrence, defense, and diplomacy 
that stretch on ahead as far as any of us can see. 
HENRY M. JACKSON, 
Chairman, Suhcommittee on National Security . 
MARCH 1, 1967. 
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THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
I. The Will to Collaborate 
The Atlantic Alliance is commonly described in terms of the commit-
ments of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the institutional arrange-
ments called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A 
formal description of this kind, however, leaves important things 
unsaid. 
The Alliance is an association, and an important one, within the 
Atlantic community-a community with a common fund of history, 
traditions, loyalties, interests, and hopes that give it life and make 
possible common efforts toward common goals. 
The Alliance at work is a group of governments with different pre-
occupations and prospects. Each ~overnment is manned by political 
leaders and other officials with particular responsibilities and interests. 
Each set of men naturally prefers .to go about its job in independence of 
the others. They overcome that inclination when they find the others 
helpful or essential in their work. As Richard Neustadt said to the 
subcommittee: "The impulse to collaborate is not a law of nature. 
It emerges from within, arising on the job, expressive of a need for 
someone else's aid or service." 
The origin of the Atlantic Alliance tends.to be recalled by reference 
to the men who founded it. It was a generation of leaders who had a 
strong will to cooperate and who could and did appeal to a popular will 
to cooperate in their countries. In the United States, Truman, 
Marshall, Lovett, Vandenberg, Acheson, Clayton . . . . In Brit-
ain, Attlee, Bevin, Ismay, Franks . . . . On the Continent, 
Spaak, Schuman, Monnet, van Kleffens, Lange, de Gasperi, Stik-
ker . . . . Some have passed on; the others, with few exceptions, 
are no longer on active service. · 
A new generation of leaders is growing up who experienced neither 
the disintegration of the West in the 30's nor the disappointed hopes 
and the risks of the early postwar years, and who must appeal to 
young people who have known peace and prosperity but not the sacri-
fice and effort at which they were bought. 
When the United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty 
in 1949, it formally and legallY. signified its judgment that our vital 
interests would be imperiled if Western Europe's many millions of 
people, great material resources, and strategic positions came under 
the domination or control of the Soviet Union. It was the conviction 
of the American Government that the freedom and security of North 
America and Western Europe were mutually dependent, and that 
neither continent could any longer "go it alone." This conviction, 
egually held in Western Europe, was the essential link between the 
allies and the principal incentive to collaborate. 
Today, the wei~ht of private and governmental opinion on both 
sides of the Atlantic supports the North Atlantic Treaty as an expres-
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sion of fundamental common need and common interest. (Even 
President de Gaulle has stated that he re~ards the Treaty as useful to 
French security and has not given notice of withdrawal from the 
Treaty or the North Atlantic Council.) The foundation of the 
Alliance is therefore still intact and the basic incentive to cooperate 
is still at work-but there is handwriting on the wall. 
The apparent stability of the East-West military balance, a decade 
and a half of economic growth without historical parallel, and prog-
ress toward Western Europe's economic integration, supplemented in 
some measure by a hopeful interpretation of Soviet intentions, have 
led to a notable change in West European attitudes. The people of 
Western Europe have regained a lively confidence in their institu-
tions and in their future. A sense of security has replaced the earlier 
sense of danger. We see among some young people (and even among 
some who are old enough to remember how the Soviet Union behaved 
when the West was weak) a temptation to assume that because no 
European country has disappeared behind the Iron Curtain since the 
Czechoslovak coup of 1948, a strong Western defense is no longer 
necessary. A logic which concludes that because deterrence has been 
successful, it is no longer necessary, would appeal to Aesop! 
The disrepair of NATO's military arrangements is apparent. The 
most visible cracks have been produced by President de Gaulle's 
wrecking hammer. France will be fighting by her allies, we are told, 
if one of them is subjected to "unprovoked attack", but her Presi-
dent reserves the right to decide whether an attack is unprovoked. 
As John McCloy commented to the subcommittee: "This is bound 
to introduce an equivocal note in the Alliance itself, and I do not 
believe it can be ascribed to a mere slip of the pen." 
Some Westerners, preoccupied with other worries, or weary of the 
cold war and skeptical about policies that have not brought it to 
an end or desiring to experiment with new approaches to the East, 
are finding it comfortable to justify a reduced effort by the Atlantic 
allies as a reasonable response to what they call the "new situation." 
In many countries new political forces are gathering, seeking to develop 
new issues or to exploit the frustrations that have grown up around 
old ones, and some voices are echoing the familiar Soviet call for the 
settlement of European security issues by Europeans alone. 
Signs of letdown are evident in many quarters in a renewal of 
narrow, provincial attitudes of a nationaliStic, or to coin a term, 
regionalistic nature. The most pessimistic observers believe that 
the days of concerted Atlantic efforts are numbered. The conclusion 
is premature; a warning is not. 
The Atlantic Alliance has never been an end in itself. But it has 
unfinished business as an agency of common defense, a foundation for 
a solid European settlement permitting the reunification of Germany, 
and a source of stability in Europe as a pillar of a peaceful international 
order. 
A J>rincipal task facing today's allied leaders is to enhance the will 
to collaborate in the unfinished work of the Alliance. The purpose of 
this staff report is to suggest certain attitudes and approl\ches that 
might be helpful to that end, including ways in which the United 
States Government might improve some of its own attitudes and 
approaches. 
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II. The Soviet Problem 
In the presence of the external stimulus once provided by Stalin, it 
was not difficult for the allies to reach a workable consensus on the 
nature of the Soviet threat. The job is more difficult today. But 
such a consensus is the foundation of coordinated allied efforts. 
The Chinese Communists openly proclaim their determination to rid 
the world of their enemies. Not so with the Soviet Union; th·e Soviet 
rulers fly the banners of peaceful coexistence. The painful experiences 
of the two decades since V -E day compel us to look beyond these 
banners to the realities of Soviet policy. 
The consistent aim of the Soviet Union, as revealed Qy Russian 
actions, has been to achieve a dominating position in both Europe and 
the Far East. In the West the bar to the achievement of this a1m has 
been the forces and firmness of the Atlantic Alliance, and since 1949 
the Russians have been trying to break the Alliance. For the same 
reason the_y have tried to block progress toward unity in Western 
Europe. They have correctly seen the emergence of any coalition 
powerful enough to balance Soviet power in Europe as an obstacle in 
their path. They have correctly recognized the key role of the 
Federal Republic m both the Atlantic Alliance and in a united Europe 
and have therefore blocked German unification and sought to divide 
and confuse German opinion and to foster anti-German sentiments 
everywhere. 
Moscow is no\v deeply involved in diplomatic maneuvers in Europe, 
and is overlooking few opportunities to fish in troubled Western waters. 
(The Soviet leaders have been showing a livE)ly interest in the fishing 
at the Quai d'Orsay.) Even though the Kremlin may be unsure 
about many aspects of its world policies, thE're is no evidence that it 
wants a strong NATO. On the contrary, to take them at their word, 
the Soviet leaders anticipate that over a period of time the interests 
and influence of the United States in Europe will be reduced to the 
point where NATO will break up and Moscow will be able to deal 
with a fragmented Western Europe of small and medium-sized states, 
with obvious implications for the ability of these states-including 
West Germany-to pursue policies not meeting with Soviet approval. 
The Soviet political campaign to strengthen its influence on the 
European Continent is backed up by all the elements of Soviet power. 
The Soviet army is the major conventional military force in Europe. 
Front line Soviet forces in central Europe are approximately matched 
by NATO's front line forces in West German_y, but the Soviet Union 
has superior conventional forces in reserve. Furthermore, the Soviet 
Union has typically done more than the Atlantic allies, and sooner, 
to provide its armies with the most modern equipment. It is also a 
very weighty advantage that the main strength of the Warsaw Pact 
is p_rovided by one army with uniform equipment, a centrally con-
trolled supply system, great room for maneuver, and a single military 
doctrine. 
The Soviet Union has 700 to 800 MRBM and IRBM launchers, 
most of which are located near its Western borders and targeted on 
Western Europe. Soviet leaders are carrying out an intensive nuclear 
weapons research and development program. They have increased 
quantitatively and improved qualitatively their offensive and de-
fensive strategic nuclear forces at a far faster rate than had been 
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predicted by top American officials. Moscow has begun to deploy an 
anti-ballistic missile defense system. Obviously the Soviet rulers do 
not accept the notion, popular in some American circles, that military 
technology and strategic strength have reached a kind of plateau and 
that the present balance of forces is fixed for all time to come. 
At least for the time being, the Kremlin seems to want an "all 
quiet" on its Western front. The turbulent turn of events in Red 
China, together with Russia's ancient fears of simultaneous involve-
ments in major troubles in Europe and Asia, has probably dictated 
some caution for now in approaching problems in the West. The 
nationalist trends in Eastern Europe have reduced the responsiveness 
of some East European states to Soviet command and to a certain 
degree have limited Soviet freedom of action. However, nothing is 
more guarded than the Kremlin's decision-making process, and this 
makes it difficult for anyone on the outside to predict whether the 
Soviet leadership is in a cautious or risk-taking mood. 
It is true that the communist movement is not "homogeneous" and 
"monolithic.", but it does not follow that the Soviet capacity to in-
fluence the world seene is inconsequential. 
Moreover, Moscow has long prtded itself on its opportunism, and 
it would be dangerous to assume that the future will provide no tempt-
ing opportunities to contrive a local erisis or to conduct probmg 
operations, with the idea of calling things off if the West is firm, but 
with the idea of pushing history alon~ the path of Soviet expectations 
if things develop favorably. Sometimes 1t is difficult to call things 
off, especially in an area as politically unstable and as heavily armed 
as central Europe. 
Stalin tried to evict the West from Berlin in 1948-49, but it was 
Khrushchev who cranked up the Berlin crisis of 1958-62 and who 
tried to place missiles in Cuba in 1962. Perhaps the eresent rulers 
will eschew adventures in the West, but how long wtll they rule? 
Few, if any, students of Soviet affairs anticipated Khrushchev's 
ouster, and few are likely to anticipate the next shift, or the policy 
changes to which it may lead. 
Here and there it is being said that the Sino-Soviet split is final. 
Although it may not be possible to patch up Sino-Soviet relations 
during China's present convulsions, a future reconciliation which 
offers many mutual advantages cannot be ruled out. 
In short, the challenge of the East-whether principally Russian, 
Chinese, or Sino-Soviet-will continue for an mdeterminate time. 
To some extent allied officials are bound to view the dangers through 
the perspective of their own national preoccupations. In consequence, 
they ma;y not see the situation. at a given J>eriod in exactly the same 
terms. But it is very important that allied governments do not 
base their plans or their performance on unsubstantiated rumors, 
wishful thinking, or self-serving speculations, no matter what their 
exalted source. 
The allied leaders need therefore to give a higher priority to the 
continuing, joint review of the evidence bearing on the complex forms 
of the Soviet challenge, including up-to-date, realistic appraisals of 
the East European and Chinese situations. 
Policy-making begins with information, and policy differences 
between governments often spring from differences over what the 
facts are or how they should be interpreted. A joint allied approach 
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to the evaluation of intelligence could make an important contribution 
to a consensus on the contingencies for which the Alliance should be 
prepared. 
III. Military Posture 
The North Atlantic Treaty does not commit the allies to a "Q_ar-
ticular strategy or its derivative, a particular set of force goals. The 
commitment is to regard and resist an armed attack on one as an 
attack on all. As a normal thing, therefore, the allies have regularly 
reviewed strategy and force requirements against current appraisals 
of the Soviet threat. 
Unfortunately, the very premises of allied policy have had to be 
reconsidered because of De Gaulle's eviction notice to U.S. and 
NATO military facilities in France, and his pull-out of French forces 
from NATO's unified commands and coordinated military forces. 
NATO has certainly not been strengthened by the French actions, 
but the resulting difficulties are not insurmountable, given a determi-
nation by the fourteen allies to make the necessary adjustments. 
The fourteen have found a new site for SHAPE in ~elgium and for 
AFCENT (Allied Forces, Center) in the Netherlands, and have de-
cided to move the NATO Council and the Military Committee to 
Brussels. · They are busy adapting communications, infrastructure 
and defense agencies to the new situation. The fourteen now meet 
as a Defense Planning Committee under the Council to conduct the 
military affairs of the Alliance. 
Quite apart from the sabot France has thrown into the NATO works, 
British and American balance-of-payment problems together with 
German budgetary difficulties have compelled a thorough study of 
the level of British and American forces in West Germany and the 
financing of their foreign exchange costs. Nuclear problems, includ-
ing allied nuclear planning arrangements, have led to intensive discus-
sions and among other things to the formation in NATO of two per-
manent groups for nuclear planning-a pollex body called the Nuclear 
Defense Affairs Committee open to any NATO nation willing to 
participate in its work, and a Nuclear Planning Group of seven Defense 
Ministers, drawn from the full committee, to handle detailed work. 
Underway also is a· new NATO-wide effort at joint force planning. 
Out of this process may emerge a consensus on strategy and force 
requirements suited to present and foreseeable needs. There is, how-
ever, always a danger that what starts as a review may end in reverses 
and loss of mutual confidence and strength. These matters need to be 
handled with the care appropriate to decisions that could endanger 
the hard-won Euro:P,ean balance. . 
The American military J>resence in Europe is still the hard nub of 
the Western deterrent. The chief purpose of the American troop 
commitment is political: to leave no doubt in Western Europe or in 
Moscow that the United States would be completely involved from 
the outset of any move against Western Europe. We want no uncer-
tainty in the Kremlin about our intentions. It needs to be clear to 
the adversary that any act of aggression would be opposed by an 
effective American combat force, one capable of making a determined 
stand, so that the engagement would be from the start a Soviet-
6 THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
American crisis, with all that implies, not just a European one. As 
Thomas Schelling stated before the subcommittee: 
It is a sign of NATO's success that the nations of Europe 
can afford to spend so much of their attention on matters of 
nuclear authority within the Alliance, matters that have more 
to do with status than with security. But the central feature 
of NATO strategy is the presence of American troops in 
Europe * * *. 
We may lack strength, we may lack unity, we may lack 
adequate command arrangements, we may even lack the ter-
ritory to provide any defense in depth, but what we still have 
and must keep is the physical presence of American troops 
in Europe in sufficient numbers to make clear that they are a 
real force, not a token force, and that, in case of military ac-
tion, they are there to fight and not merely to sound an 
alarm * * *. · 
The American divisions that we have there, if they are 
flexible, adaptable, mobile, and properly located, can make 
a very enormous difference as to whether things get out of 
hand or, instead, can be controlled. 
The American troops, along with the European troops, are not 
there as a kind of hostage whose destruction would trigger a nuclear 
response. The Soviet Government cannot suppose that a large-scale 
attack on Western Europe could be even briefly restricted to conven-
tional forces, and therefore, if a massive attack is to be made, it \\ill 
surely begin with a nuclear strike against Western Europe and North 
A~erica, not a march of great armies across NATO's eastern bound-
aries. 
The primary function of NATO's conventional forces, with their 
vital American component, is to meet a local crisis as effectively as 
they can, posing the continuous threat that if the crisis continues and 
enlarges, the risks of escalation continue and enlarge with it-in 
particular the risks of nuclear war. To perform this function NATO 
forces capable of containing a sizable, though limited, attack are 
required. Anything less would be a standing temptation to Soviet 
probes of allied mettle, and such probes would force the allies to 
retreat or to engage in brinkmunship, with all the risks either course 
would involve. 
It is sometimes said that if most of the American divisions now in 
Europe were brought home, they could be moved back in a crisis. 
This course would involve serious risks. For example: it would be 
useless a~ainst a sizable surprise attack from the East if only because 
the requrred airfields would probably be unavailable; it would neces-
sarily make a large crisis out of a small one; it would require a dramatic 
and I>_erhaps difficult political decision to put American troops back 
into Europe; it runs the danger that returning too few trooJ>s would 
look irresolute, while returning too many would look belligerent; 
it might be too slow to prevent a crisis from getting out of control. 
The mishandling by the West of a single emergency could profoundly 
alter the prospects for stability in Europe. And in an emergency we 
must be able, without any delay, to put military forces into small 
confrontations to hold ground, not give it, and thus to improve our 
diplomatic position. The need is for forces on the ready which can 
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act without unnecessarily difficult political pre.parations. The ability 
of SACEUR to move convention& forces, With a strong American 
component, in several crises in Berlin was important to the successful 
management of those crises. General N orstad told the subcommittee: 
It is argued in some places that conventional forces were 
things of the last war or even of the 1914-1918 war. I was 
in a position to "supervise" the part of our forces in the Allied 
Forces during several confrontations in Berlin. The move-
ment of troops, the willingness to use or commit troops, was 
an important item. I just do not think we could have met 
those requirements if we had not had the conventional forces 
we had. 
Indeed, NATO's conventional power is needed not only to respond 
to emergencies that Moscow would deliberately contrive, but also to 
deal with the unforeseeable contingencies that history sometimes 
contrives-border incidents, upheavals in satellite nations that splash 
over the line, and so forth. 
It is, of course, the combat capability of conventional forces that 
counts. With the ad'Vance of technology it may be possible to make 
some redeployment of combat garrisons and the1r logiStic and support 
elements now on the Continent without reducing the capability 
needed to meet the problems of deterrence and initial front-line 
defense, In time new developments in strategic mobility-both air 
and sea-and in tactical mobility and firepower may further add to 
conventional capabilities thereby allowing some reduction in land 
forces, although the experience in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam 
is not altogether encouraging in this respect. A technological advance 
by one side has often been offset by an advance on the other side. 
Moreover, if numbers are reduced by piecemeal cuts in NATO-
assigned units, the problem of preserving the organizational integrity 
and effectiveness of these units becomes more difficult. At least for 
the time being, any sizable cutback of American and British troops in 
Europe almost surely implies a greater reliance on nuclear weapons 
and their incorporation in military operations at a. very early phase of 
hostilities. It is not self-evident that this would best serve the 
interests of the United States and its allies. 
Futhermore, force requirements are designed not only to contribute 
to deterrence and defense but also to fortify the diplomatic bargaining 
position of the West vis-a-vis the East, in particular to contribute to 
a controlled program of arms reduction and to a genuine European 
settlement. A critical question is the effect of a one-sided reduction in 
allied combat capability on the chances for a reciprocal East-West 
reduction in forces and for winning eventual Soviet acceptance of a 
stable European settlement. It is hard to see how the West can 
improve the bargainiyg position it has worked so long and hard to 
construct by weakening it-unilaterally. 
As the allies continue their search for answers to these questions a 
number of guiding principles seem pertinent: 
One. These delicate and complex issues should be examined and 
decided by all the NATO allies who wish to cooperate. The destiny 
and commitment of all Alliance members are involved. To exclude 
any member from the making of decisions on these vital issues would 
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be to invite it, in effect, to exclude itself from the taking of actions 
flowing ~herefrom. 
Two. These questions are at the heart of effective force plann~g 
under the Council and its Defense Planning Committee. The Alliance 
agencies should not be bypassed by self-appoiilted groups. 
Three. The allies need a force on the central European front to 
which no one nation contributes a disproportionate share. Too large 
a West German contribution, for example, might help the Russians to 
nourish East European fears of Germany, prejudice West Germany's 
chances of improving its relations with Eastern Europe, and thus 
delay the working out of the future role of a reunified Germany in 
Europe. 
Four. The problem of allocating defense burdens among the allies 
challenges the sincerity of each ally in living up to its obligation under 
Article 3 of the Treaty for "continuous and effective self-help and 
mutual aid." The words of that obligation were purposely placed in 
the order of their imp·ortance: "self-help and mutual aid." 
In the years since World War II Americans have provided over 
$120 billion for the strengthening of the free world. Contrary to the 
notion of some critics, we do not expect gratitude. Now that our 
European allies are back on their feet with an earning power growing 
at a rate exceeding ours, we might reasonably expect this change to 
be reflected in the sharing of the defense burden. 
It is true, of course, that a rich, powerful nation usually has to make 
the greater sacrifice and usually is in the weakest bargaining position 
within any alliance that rests upon the sharing of responsibilities and 
costs. Yet our European allies should recognize that there is inevi-
tab~y a relat.ion betweel? their williJ?~ness to draw ~n. the resources 
therr expalidmg economics are proVIding, and the willingness of the 
American people to give solid support to the principle of mutual aid. 
As things stand, most Americans and most West Europeans recog-
nize the need for a strong American combat force in Europe, but this 
attitude may change unless the European allies are willing, as they 
grow more prosperous, to assume a growing share of the costs of the 
common defense. 
To be sure, all of the allies face·balance-of-payment or budgetary 
difficulties, some greater than others. It is not easy for any of them 
to meet the costs of defense. One pitfall to be avoided is clearly 
marked: pentagonal pressuring of an ally to buy more military hard-
ware than is really useful. Mutually beneficial offsetting systems 
and other joint arrangements are needed to support a fair allocation 
of defense tasks among all the allies. 
Five. These wide-ranging issues require patient, thorough con-
sideration. They cannot be settled in haste, and still be settled 
wisely. Abrupt or unilateral changes would be unsettling and risk 
demoralizing friends and allies. If changes in force posture are to be 
made, they should flow from decisions by the Council or its Defense 
Planning Committee and should be executed with a view to minimizing 
the danger that their significance will be misinterpreted by the Soviet 
Union-or by allied governments and publics. This applies with 
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special e~phasis to any reduction of British and American forces on 
tb.Contment. 
IV. East-West Relations 
In the circumstances that are emerging in Europe and the world it 
may be possible to give increased emphasis to East-West adjustments. 
The basic objective of allied policy in Europe is not strength for 
strength's sake, or to freeze the status quo, but to create an environ-
ment for a genuine European settlement serving the legitimate 
security interests of all concerned. The hope has been that one day 
security could be achieved on terms which would put a safe end to 
Europe's unhappy division. 
That day is not, unfortunately, at hand. The only kind of a settle-
ment worth talking about is one reached with the consent of all 
parties-and, as things stand, the minimum terms demanded by each 
side exceed the maximum the other side is willing to concede. 
The problem is obviously most difficult for Germany, for it is the one 
country through which the line of division runs. The psychological 
burden of imposed disunity weighs heavily. Although no one inside 
or outside Germany can now see a way to reunite the nation that 
would be acceptable to both East and West, no one in Germany can 
repudiate the goal. Nor can Germany's allies. 
Dean Acheson's testimony to the subcommittee in April 1966 
suggested how much must be accomplished in improving the East-
West environment as a foundation of German reunification. He said: 
I would not start by trying to write peace programs, but 
by having East European countries share more in the life and 
industry and commerce of Europe. Insofar as Eastern 
Europe can be brought into the general European picture-
share in the new prosperity-this is an advantage. This 
creates a situation where you can move more freely. If this 
brings the Russians along, good. * * * lPven a position 
where people are coming together, economiCally and politi-
cally, where you could reduce the worry over the military sit-
uation, where you could begin to talk about boundaries 
without scaring everyone out of their wits, you get places. 
As far ahead as one can see, progress toward a European settlement 
means a steady and progressive erosion of the importance of the line 
dividing Europe and partitioning Germany, rather than its dramatic 
erasure by a formal agreement at the summit. Expanded trade 
relations, closer diplomatic ties, and better cultural, tourist and 
scientific contacts between East and West are possible. The Wall 
may be removed someday. If the division through Europe loses 
some of its significance, the outlines of a genuine settlement permitting 
German reunification may become visible. 
President Johnson's major policy speech qn Europe in October 1966 
proposed a greater effort in the drrection of East-West reconciliation 
as a basis for Germany's peaceful reunification. The new West 
German Government is obviously thinking along the same lines, and 
has begun a long and delicate effort to recast its relations with Eastern 
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Europe. West German Chancellor Kiesinger has put it this way, in 
words especially directed to Moscow: 
We wish the reunification of our people in freedom and 
in peace. We too know that for this not simply a vote is 
enoughi, that preconditions must be established, and that 
above all a climate of mutual trust and mutual understanding 
must exist as the condition for ·the solution of this most 
difficult European problem * * *. I implore the Soviet 
Russian leaders to take this desire of ours seriously, above 
all our will to peace, which will ultimately serve the vital 
interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union, too. 
As the West Germans explore the avenues of accommodation theJ 
deserve our sympathy, understanding and support. For there will 
undoubtedly be many detours, disappointments and false starts before 
th~ reach their destination. 
It is not always helpful to think in grand, let alone grandiose, terms. 
Western J?urposes must include German reunification, but this purpose 
is more likely to be set back than advanced by a diplomacy directly 
aimed at a quick and full settlement. As the West pursues its long-
term goals, certain principles of conduct should be kept in mind: 
One. The steadiness and continuity of American policy are essential 
to the growth of conditions favorable to a settlement, and the people 
of West Germany, in particular, should feel the confidence in American 
policy that comes from working together: confidence that they can 
count on American su:pport for their legitimate goals, that the United 
States will not enter mto any deal with the East over their heads, 
and that they will not be taken by surprise on any approaches to 
the Soviet Union. 
Two. The importance of full participation by the Federal Re-
public in a developing European community, including the United 
Kingdom, cannot be overemphasized. The United States has long 
supported the concept of a united Western Europe. We should be 
prepared to accept progress in this direction even if it means, as it 
may, the development of a ''European caucus" in some Atlantic 
Alliance agencies and the growth of a certain "European nationalism" 
in political, economic, and military affairs. 
The challenge to Western Euro:ee is to find whatever degree and 
form of closer concert or union will imP.rove its health and strength 
and its will to play its full and respons1ble part in world affairs. In 
the long run, Western Europe will achieve effective unity only if its 
members, including France, are willing to forego turning the move-
ment for unification to selfish nationalistic advantage. In these 
matters, the United States Government should restrain its Mother 
Hen proclivities. Only the Europeans can decide these issues. 
Three. The German problem is unavoidably and inescapably an 
international problem; the fact is inherent in Germany's division, 
its size, and the implications of its reunification for European stability. 
This is to say that German affairs are not solely German affairs; 
non-Germans are necessarily concerned and will necessarily have a 
voice. All the more reason, therefore, why her allies should not be j>arty to any unnecessary or unfair discrimination against the Federal 
Republic. 
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The Federal Republic has formally agreed not to produce nuclear 
weapons on its territory and has voluntarily renounced national 
ownership of nuclear weapons. All West German armed forces are 
assigned to NATO, and the Federal Republic therefore has no national 
troops in the full sense. There is no West German general staff 
and there are no arrangements for the autonomous employment of 
West German troops by the West German Government even in 
defense of West German territory. 
With the full cooperation and agreement of West Germany, there-
fore, arrangements have been devised that should be reassuring to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as to many in the West. 
Four. There are limits beyond which the efforts for reconciliation 
might seem to ratify the stattJs quo of a divided Germany. In such 
circumstances, the possibility could not be ruled out that some future 
West German government, disillusioned with and embittered toward 
the West, would seek to work out by itself the best deal it could with 
the Soviet Union. 
In their relations with the East the allies should heed the words 
Secretary General Brosio spoke to the NATO Parliamentarians' 
Conference in November 1966: 
The West has shown a great deal of good will in attempting 
to meet Soviet positions throughout the years. The Soviets, 
for their part, have not only remained adamant but have 
maintained the initiative * * *. We are perhaps paying 
here the price of our invaluable freedom. We are not able to 
stand firm long enough on .positions which appear to us right; 
our moral questing and mtellectual inconstancy force us 
continuously to conceive and offer new solutions. Our oppo-
nents, however, remain steady and obdurate and wait for our 
further steps. 
Five. A possibility that the Soviet Union may prove willing to 
make some East-West adjustments does not constitute a reason to 
pay less attention to the defense of Western Europe. As Thomas 
Schelling said to the subcommittee: 
If indeed the Soviet Union has at last decided that it 
either does not want to conquer that part of the world, or 
would not know how to eontrol it if it did, that may be 
precisely because we have achieved a deterrent and potential 
defense in Western Europe that is now a foregone conclusion 
to the Soviet Union, and they have le,arned the facts of life. 
I would not like to disturb that Soviet belief. I would not 
like to offer them any alternative temptation at a time when 
quite possibly they are willing at least to consider weakening 
some of their own defensive arrangements in Eastern Europe 
itself. · 
Six. The North Atlantic Council is the instrument by and through 
which the allies should coordinate their policies toward Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the Council is an 
agency for negotiations with the East. Depending on the subject 
matter, discussions and negotiations might be carried on bilate:riilly 
or in various multilateral meetings. In every case, however, the 
substance of East-West discussions should be regularly reported to 
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the North Atlantic Council and there should be no separate agree-
ments against the interests, or without the knowledge, of interested 
allies .. 
V. Alliance Decision-Making 
Decision-making in an alliance is a. consultative process. Poor 
substitute though it may be for an executive, it is the only means 
sovereign authorities have to reconcile their differ:.mces and reach a 
workable consensus. In this :process, no ally is too small to contribute 
to :policy decisions: an initiative in December 1966 to strengthen the 
political role of the Alliance was taken not by one of the bigger allies, 
but by Belgium. And no ally can afford to stand aloof: the golden 
rule of an alliance is to consult with others as you would have others 
consult with you. 
Even at its best, of course, consultation cannot extinguish deep 
differences of judgment between _policy-makers over many issues, or 
erase basic disparities of power. By sharing information and analyses 
and by allowing time for patterns of thought to change, consultation 
can help to reduce differences, to develop a common perspective, and 
to minimize the consequences of differences that remain. 
Skilled practice of the art of consultation is important to a big 
power. It helps to take the sting out of its bigness. This places a 
high r,remium on the ability of American officials genuinely and gen-
erous y to collaborate with others who are also knowledgeable and 
concerned about the emerging problems of the Alliance. 
THE NORTH ATLANTIC CouNciL 
The Council is the top allied agency. All members should resolve 
to use the Council and its Defense Planning Committee as the central 
bodies for inter-allied consultation. This rule, although recognized 
in ·principle, has not always been observed in practice by the members, 
including the United States. 
A strong case can be made for appojnting Permanent Representa-
tives to the Council with sufficient political standing in their own 
countries to have direct access to heads of government, and, where 
possible constitutionally, to legislatures and parliaments. When 
Council decisions and recommendations are referred to member 
governments, the Representatives would thereby be better able to· 
argue for their support and to explain and defend the requirements 
of the Alliance before their own countrymen. 
FoRwARD PoLITICAL PLANNING 
To improve allied consultation on complex and sensitive political 
issues, NATO's policy planning activities could and should be strength-
ened. What most allied leaders want, and what helps them at home-
and what may therefore enhance their willingness and ability to 
collaborate in an emergency-is confidence that they are involved in 
the early consideration of major issues and can make their views and 
wants Known before a. bigger ally comes to a. final decision and acts. 
Of course, the big powerS need the same assurance that the smaller 
allies will not act unilaterally on important matters affecting the 
Alliance. 
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 13 
The Berlin task force provides a useful model. In that case the 
governments concerned disagreed on many issues yet each was insured 
the opportunity to question anything and to obtain consideration of 
alternatives before action was taken. In view of the special role of 
the United States, assurance that our decisions could be questioned 
and challenged by others reduced public disagreements between the 
governments and contr~buted to close coQ,peration throughout the 
crisis and thus to its successful handling. The arrangements made it 
possible for the participating governments to act along agreed lines 
with full awareness of what the others were doing and why. 
In a particular case, such as Berlin, it may be desirable to center 
planning in Washington. As a general principle, however, it seems 
desirable to build up the role of the Council and its Secretariat and to 
concentrate planning at the Council's headquarters. 
SACEUR AND SHAPE 
The Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the task forces 
should take full advantage of the advice and assistance of SACEUR 
and SHAPE. SACEUR is the agent of the whole Alliance, but, by 
virtue of his second hat as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in 
Europe (CINCEUR), he provides a most useful connection to the 
President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. 
forces. Furthermore, it is through SACEUR and SHAPE that the 
development of coordinated allied military plans, the coordination of 
any allied military actions, and the integratiOn of German forces into 
the Western defense system, are carried out. SACEUR has proved 
an indispensable instrument in periods of crisis. McGeorge Bundy 
expressed it this way: 
It is good that on the issue of keeping NATO intact 
General de Gaulle is still alone, for if the General's position 
were to be imitated, the principal Western instrument for 
effective control of crisis in Europe would be destroyed: 
This instrument is the Supreme Allied Command in Eu-
rope * * *. In moments of crisis the vital need of the 
Alliance is political unity backed by American strength * * *. 
Without an effective command-plainly responsive both to 
the Alliance as a whole and to Washington as the center of 
strategic strength-there· would be no instrument for meas-
ured response in any new crisis, and without that instrument 
we should lose a critical governor for peace. 
DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC AREA 
Greater use should be made of the North Atlantic Council for the 
multilateral discussion of issues outside the North Atlantic area in-
cluding the problem of Communist China. These issues are bound 
to be the subject of many bilateral discussions among governments. 
And the Alliance itself, of course, does not entitle one ally to claim the 
support of others on matters beyond the obligations undertaken in 
the Treaty. But there is a clear need for more discussion and ex-
change of ideas on the many threats to the interests of Western 
powers arising in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. 
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In such discussions the European allies have much to contribute from 
their knowledge and long experience. As Alastair Buchan has written: 
If the NATO Council became the most important center 
in the West for the discussion of economic, political and, 
where relevant, military developments outside the Atlantic 
area, its effectiveness and influence would grow rather than 
diminish. Its diScussions have a tradition of privacy which 
is unobtainable in other Western caucuses, for instance at 
the United Nations * * * the Council is the AIIiance in 
plenary session, and its discussions give member governments 
a sense of t.he way the views of their Western colleagues are 
developllib in a fashion that no other body can. 
INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONSULTATION 
Not simply the government executive, but the legislator too, may 
grow in understanding through inter-allied meetings and discussions. 
In particular, the North Atlantic Assembly (formerly called the 
NATO Parliamentarians' Conference), though it is an unofficial 
body, has contributed to a broader appreciation of the role of the 
Alliance, to informing public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, 
and to stimulating some successful NATO ventures. 
Recently, the Assembly proposed that it should have a more recog-
nized relationship with the North Atlantic Council. In resl?onse to 
this proposal, the Council might well give such recognitiOn and 
volunteer an annual report on the state of the Alliance and the issues 
before it. For its part, the Assembly should improve its own organi-
zation and procedures, for example: a stronger Secretariat and better 
preparation of agenda items. 
JoiNT VENTURES oN MuTUAL PRoBLEMs 
· The Atlantic allies need to find more ways to help each other with 
one another's yractical problems-and thus to make collaboration 
in the affairs o the Atlantic community a plus in terms of national 
politics. Richard Neustadt made this comment before the sub-
committee: 
If one wants to tie the policies of governments together, 
over time, one seeks joint ventures or concerns which link 
the daily doings of key men on either side, making them 
dependent on each other in their work, giving them concrete 
incentives to collaborate * * *. Ventures or concerns in 
common * * * give men inside each ~overnment a hand-
hold on the hopes and fears of men inside the other as they 
do their work and pursue their needs in their own bargaining 
arena, day by day. For a peacetime alliance, lacking Stalin 
or his like, few thmgs can help more to keep two governments 
together. 
A case in point: throughout Western Europe one of the most 
fashionable topics of conversation is the "technological gap" between 
the United States and Western Europe. The gap may actually be 
widening. Yet there seems to be no agreement in Europe on what 
really needs to be done, or how far West European governments 
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wo.!l).d be ready to J>O?l t~eir efforts to ma~e a~d exploit technological 
advances. The field IS wide open for scrutmy m Western Europe and 
in such trans-Atlantic forums as OECD. 
There is no shortage of such problems of mutual concern. As has 
been suggested in this report, opportunities abound for mutually 
helpful cooperation on problems that do not have to be invented but 
are already high on national agendas. 
U.S. PoLICY-MAKING 
As this report ho.S-·einphasizcd, the United Stat~ Government 
cannot work effectively on the unfinished business .._f.-the Alliance 
without attending to some of its own attitudes and approaches. 
These further lines of improvement commend themselves: 
Particularly in matters affecting the East-West military balance, 
safety-first is still the rule, or should be. The attitude of some high 
officials about anti-missile defenses that "we cannot afford to do much 
about it" could end up endangering the credibility of the Western 
nuclear deterrent and unsteadying the Western resolve at a moment 
of crisis. The price of collective safety and individual liberty is 
high-and may go still higher. Yet as Robert Lovett told a predeces-
sor subcommittee: "We can do whatever w.e have to do in order to 
survive * * *." 
In working with allies, of course, there is no substitute for confidence 
in the word of the American Government. That is why playing with 
facts and figures, even if it will gain a few yards now and then, may 
lose the game. Not all of our appointed officials have learned this 
lesson. It will be a sad day if the people come to agree with Mark 
Twain that "there are three kinds of hes: lies, damned lies and sta-
tistics." 
Clear and reasoned policy, approved at the top of the government, 
is the precondition of effective cooperation with allies. Too often 
American officials negotiate from divergent points of view, tripping 
over each other in the process and confusing our allies and ourselves. 
This is bound to result in making a difficult situation more difficult. 
There is still much to be done in providing timely, approved formula-
tions of policy and unkinking lines of authority in the conduct of 
Atlantic affairs. 
The founders of the Atlantic Alliance were forward-looking in 1949. 
Their successors should be equally forward-looking today. The future 
is filled with challenges no one of the allies can handle in isolation, and 
that neither North America nor Western Europe can meet alone. 
Today's political leaders-executive and legislative-have solemn 
duties. Theirs is the main responsibilit~ to assure the common de-
fense, to advance the cause of a genuine European settlemeqt, and to 
provide for stability in Europe as a basis for a peaceful international 
society. They must inspire the oncoming generation of young people 
to do its best in the unfinished work of the Alliance. · 
For today as _yesterday the need for the Alliance is fresh and com-
pelling: it Is difficult to Imagine a hopeful future which does not rest 
on the stability and steadiness of our association, and, of course, 
especially on the steadiness of American policy. 
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